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Abstract
The Residential Aged Care (RAC) Sector in Australia is significant in terms of the ageing
population (consistent with most developed countries), and the fact that it will affect the
majority of the population in terms of the need for RAC at some stage in their lives. Having
access to information for stakeholders to make informed and timely decisions regarding the
comparison of RAC providers is often difficult due to there being higher demand than supply,
small timeframe to make decisions with a high emotional content and the difficulty in
changing providers. Information was gathered from the RAC provider's website, reports and
other publicly available information, to determine their level of governance disclosure, over a
three year period. It was found that the RAC providers should not just be limited to their legal
reporting requirements (mandatory), but instead should also endeavour to disclose additional
voluntary information, in order for their stakeholders to make informed decisions. In
addressing the Australian RAC Sector's stakeholder governance information needs, a
governance framework (RAC Sector Governance Framework) and the G-CARD
(Governance Checklist Aged Residential Disclosure) Model were developed for this sector to
improve governance disclosure. This research provides new insights and a basis for further
research to determine whether the Australian RAC Sector have improved their consistency
and adequacy of their governance disclosure through the use of the proposed G-CARD
Model and associated framework.

Keywords: Governance, Stakeholder Theory, RAC Governance Framework, G-CARD
Model

1.0 Introduction
Consistent with most developed countries, Australia has an ageing population (Australian
Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 2010). In most developed countries, this trend is predominantly
due to declining mortality, and sustained low fertility rates. Nearly one in every seven
Australians is aged 65 or over (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), 2011).
This presents the challenge for communities and governments of increasing demand for
formal care services for the aged (Borowski & McDonald, 2007). Australia’s Aged Care
System consists of three core service streams: residential care, community care, and flexible
care (AIHW, 2012). Residential Aged Care (RAC) is ‘personal and/or nursing care provided
to a person in a residential care service in which the person is also provided with
accommodation that includes meals, cleaning services, furniture and equipment’ (AIHW,
2012, p.76). Community care (The Community Aged Care Packages Program) assists older
people residing in their own homes, by providing services including home nursing, assistance
with meals, shopping, bathing, and transport (ABS, 2010).
Flexible care services provide a mixture of residential and community care services, such as
the Transition Care Program and the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Flexible
Aged Care program (ABS, 2008; Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service
Provision (SCRGSP), 2013). The main providers of RAC services are Not-for-Profit (NFP)
(60%), private (30%) and government (10%) organisations. Overall, the NFP sector
(dominated by religious organisations) is the largest provider. Individual facilities are also
growing larger, with 45% offering over 60 places and 6% offering less than 20 places
(AIHW, 2012a).
This research focuses on the governance information RAC providers disclose to decisionmakers and whether this information meets their needs. Information disclosure is vital for the
‘efficient functioning of markets’ (Bayoud, 2012, p.76). A lack of information disclosure can
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result in information asymmetry (IA). IA exists when one group has an information
advantage over another. Information plays a vital role in decision-making informed by public
(freely available) and private information (that only available, if at all, to limited audiences).
Information that managers disclose to the market decreases IA (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2006).
This research will allow RAC providers and their stakeholders to consider the current level of
governance disclosure required and the level of voluntary disclosures providers in the sector
choose to disclose; and whether this level of disclosure is adequate for stakeholders to make
informed decisions.
Corporate governance has become an essential element of the corporate environment.
However, there has been little research on such reporting in the context of the RAC sector in
Australia. Significantly, this research aims to inform policy debates on minimum governance
disclosures, and their impacts. This research may also lead to organisations reporting more
relevant information to their stakeholders, in relation to their governance practices. This may
further assist decision-makers as it may encourage more open and transparent governance
disclosures. Better-informed decisions may act to facilitate more efficient Government
funding allocation processes, potentially better addressing the demand and supply gaps in the
RAC sector in Australia.

2.0 Theoretical Background
Stakeholder theory is both a positive and normative theory. Stakeholder theory requires
management to “give equal consideration to the interests of all stakeholders and, when these
interests conflict, manage the business so as to attain the optimal balance among them”
(Deegan, 2003). A stakeholder is “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by
the achievements of an organisation’s objectives” (Seetharaman, Subramanian & Shyong,
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2005). An organisation’s stakeholders include employees, shareholders, suppliers, investors,
customers, and government. Basically stakeholders are anyone who has a vested interest in
the organisation or a right to obtain information about it (Dellaportas, Gibson, Alagiah,
Hutchinson, Leung and Homrigh, 2005). The challenge for management is to try and meet
these conflicting demands. Generally, the more important the stakeholder, the more important
it is for the organisation to meet their demands (Deegan, 2003).
Stakeholder theory has both an ethical or normative branch, and a managerial branch. The
ethical branch deliberates matters related with rights to material privileges that should be met
irrespective of the influence of the stakeholders involved (Drever, Stanton & McGowan,
2007). The managerial branch envisages the organisation will lean toward satisfying the
information demands of those stakeholders who are imperative to its continuing survival
(Drever, Stanton & McGowan, 2007). What a specific stakeholder demands and obtains
depends upon how influential they are perceived to be, with power frequently measured in
relation to the scarcity of the resources controlled via the stakeholders. ‘‘Disclosure of
information is considered to represent an important strategy in managing stakeholders’’
(Deegan, 2004, p.278).

Good corporate governance ensures organisations set appropriate objectives, have in place
systems and structures to meet these objectives, and the means to control and monitor their
activities and managers (OECD, 2015). According to the OECD (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development) corporate governance is explained as follows:
“The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and
responsibilities among the different participants in the organisation … and lays down
the rules and procedures for decision-making. By doing this, it also provides the
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structure through which the company objectives are set, and means of attaining those
objectives and monitoring performance”.
Corporate governance rules are required because of the nature in which organisations are
structured. With the exception of small family operated businesses, the people that contribute
the resources to the business (capital investors, shareholders or lenders) do not directly
manage the business (the separation of ownership from operational control). The corporate
governance framework is primarily concerned with managing this relationship (Rankin,
Stanton, McGowan, Ferlauto & Tilling, 2012).
The mechanisms organisations employee to govern (direct and control), depends on the
effectiveness of its structures and processes in place. Good corporate governance ensures
organisations set appropriate objectives, have in place systems and structures to meet these
objectives, and the means to control and monitor their activities and managers (OECD, 2015).
Many countries in both the developing and developed world have established rules or
descriptions of practices “that should be included in corporate governance systems” that form
either

recommendations

or

legal

requirements,

these

include,

for

example

China, the OECD, the United States, etc.
By comparing each of the regimes we can combine them to see the differences and
similarities in a variety of combinations and that in itself shows the lack of consistency when
designing and applying corporate governance initiatives.
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Table 1: Comparisons of Corporate Governance Mechanisms
‘Protective’
Principles
Governance
Framework
Shareholder
Importance
Disclosure &
Transparency
Board’s
Responsibilities
Directors’
Performance
Remuneration
Auditor
Independence
Conflicts
of
Interest
Company
Oversight
Board
Corporate
Fraud
Penalties
&
Sentencing
Ethical
Decisions
Risk
Management
Stakeholders

China

New
Zealand


OECD

US

UK

AUS



Nordic
Regions
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The Governance Statement is a mechanism for an organisation “to demonstrate that their
board and management are alive to the importance of having proper and effective corporate
governance arrangements and to communicate to [their stakeholders] …the robustness of
their particular approach to corporate governance” (ASX Corporate Governance Council,
2014, p.9). Governance is the primary means by which a RAC declares that it meets its social
responsibilities in relation to how organisations are directed and controlled.

Within the governance statement, disclosure should also include information in relation to
Board members for example qualification, experience, and other directorships. In Australia,
6

publicly listed companies according to listing rule 4.10 (ASIC Act 2001) must disclose a
corporate governance statement outlining compliance with each of the governance principles
as outlined in Table 1. Companies must disclose an ‘if not why not’ statement in relation to
this disclosure. Any other entity in Australia that is not publicly listed does not need to
disclose any governance information.
The Australian RAC sector consists of 2,724 facilities of which are operated by 1,069
providers across Australia during the 2011-12 financial year (ABS data collection period).
This research involved an exhaustive search of the 1,069 RAC providers’ websites and other
public electronic means of dissemination of their annual reports. Of the 1,069 RAC providers,
only 197 publicly disclosed their annual report to their stakeholders. These 197 RAC
providers accounted for 752 RAC facilities operating across Australia during the 2011-12
ABS data collection period. Figure 1 further depicts the Australian RAC provider sample
frame for this study.
Figure 1: Australian RAC Provider Sample Data Set
RAC Providers
(1,069)

No publicly available
Annual Report
(872)

Removed from
Sample Data Set

Publicly available
Annual Report
(197)

Community Based (50)
Charitable (30)
Religious (25)

Government
(87)

Private Inc. Bodies (4)
Publicly Listed Co. (1)
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Figure 1 shows only one publicly listed company (out of the 197 that disclosed an annual
report) that needs to disclose a governance statement, to comply with Australian Securities
and Investment Commission legislation (ASIC Act 2001) which leads to the following
research question:
RQ: What is the level of disclosure and reporting of governance practices by Australian
Residential Aged Care providers to stakeholders?

3.0 Empirical Tests
This study involved the researcher collecting, analysing, integrating and drawing inferences,
from the data findings (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998), using the quantitative approach.
Quantitative research “is a formal, objective, systematic process in which numerical data are
used to obtain information about the world” (Burns & Grove, 2005, p.23).
This study investigates publicly available archival data and other disclosures of Australian
RAC providers. Annual, financial and other reports of this study are examined over the
period of three years (2013, 2014 and 2015), using archival data. During these three years the
Australian Government introduced the Living Longer Living Better reforms which are
“aimed at building a better and fairer aged care system” (AIHW, 2013); and the My Aged
Care website, designed to improve the disclosure of aged care facilities by developing a
central location for users to more easily access vital information in a timely manner.
Traditionally, content analysis has been utilised to evaluate the extent, listed companies,
disclose different items in annual reports (Hackston & Milne, 1996; Gray et al., 1995;
Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Zeghal & Ahmed, 1990; Cowen Ferren & Parker, 1987; Guthrie &
Mathews, 1985). That literature has been inclined to report the level of disclosure of certain
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corporate governance initiatives. Those studies have often contrasted these elements with
previous national or international research (Guthrie & Abeysekera, 2006).
The annual report has been the most widely utilised source for gathering governance
information. However, there are other sources to gather this material, including; standalone
reports and online material (website). Although researchers in governance have used other
materials, an organisation’s annual report has remained the dominant source (Guthrie &
Abeysekera, 2006). Here those sources are accessed.
Table 2: Governance Data Collection
Category

Description of Process

Director’s report
(or equivalent)

Search for the heading “Director’s report”, “Chairperson’s report”,
“Chairman’s report”, or “Mayor’s report”

Governance
Statement
Number of
Directors

Searched for word governance, then if they complied with 8 ASX
recommendations
Count number listed in annual report, financial report or own
website
 Males (title, name, picture or not enough information provided)
 Females (title, name, picture or not enough information
provided)

Qualifications

Full title of qualification or initials/abbreviation provided

Experience

One word or short description of director’s or member of council’s
experience

Other Directorships

Read each director’s profile to ascertain whether they list other
directorships previously or currently held

The data collected compared the level of disclosures between the different Australian RAC
providers and across the three-year collection period. SPSS Statistical Software was
employed to analyse the data using comparative and correlational analysis.

4.0 Results
Governance data were collated in relation to the number and percentage of RAC Providers
that included their governance statement, Director’s report (or equivalent), board members’
9

qualifications, experience and other directorships on other boards. This information was
obtained from the RAC providers’ annual and/or financial reports, from the period of 2013
through to 2015. Two statistical tests (comparative analysis and correlation analysis) were
conducted using SPSS to determine the level of Governance Disclosure Australian RAC
providers provide to their stakeholders.
4.0.1 Comparative Analysis
Table 3 presents a summary of the comparative statistical analysis of the RAC governance
disclosure, averaged over the three-year period (2013-2015).
Table 3: Summary of Comparative Statistical Analysis
Governance

Government
(87)

Privately Owned
/Publicly Listed
(5)

Community
/Religious
(105)

47.5%

66.7%

18.1%

41

3

19

87.4%

80.0%

70.1%

76

4

74

11.9%

6.7%

14.9%

10

0.3

16

25.7%

53.3%

32.1%

22

3

34

2.7%

26.7%

3.2%

2

1

3

Governance Statement
Percentage
Number
Director’s Report (or equivalent)
Percentage
Number
Qualifications
Percentage
Number
Experience
Percentage
Number
Other Directorships
Percentage
Number
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4.0.1.1 Governance Statement
When examining the overall disclosure of the governance statement according to the
classification of the RAC organisations, on average over the three years, the government
providers account for 47.5% (41 out of 87) of the corporate governance statement disclosed,
the privately owned or publicly listed providers account for 66.7% (3 out of 5) of the
corporate governance statement disclosed, and the community and religious providers
account for 18.1% (19 out of 105) of the corporate governance statement disclosed. Of those
that disclosed the Government RAC Providers had a higher disclosure level than the privately
owned/publicly listed or community/religious providers.

4.0.1.2 Director’s Report (or equivalent)
At often times the Director’s report was part of the Financial and/or Annual Report, at other
times it was a standalone report. When examining the overall disclosure of the director’s
report (or equivalent) according to the classification of the RAC organisations, on average
over the three years, the government providers account for 87.4% (76 out of 87) of the
director’s report (or equivalent) disclosed, the privately owned or publicly listed providers
account for 80.0% (4 out of 5) of the director’s report (or equivalent) disclosed, and the
community and religious providers account for 70.1% (74 out of 105) of the director’s report
(or equivalent) disclosed. Of those that disclosed the Government and community/religious
RAC Providers had a higher disclosure level than the privately owned/publicly listed
providers.
4.0.1.3 Qualifications
When examining the overall disclosure of the Board members’ qualifications according to the
classification of the RAC organisations, on average over the three years, the government
providers account for 11.9% (10 out of 87) of the Board members’ qualifications disclosed,
11

the privately owned or publicly listed providers account for 6.7% (0.3 out of 5) of the Board
members’ qualifications disclosed, and the community and religious providers account for
14.9% (16 out of 105) of the Board members’ qualifications disclosed. Of those that
disclosed the community/religious RAC Providers had a higher disclosure level than the
privately owned/publicly listed or Government providers.
4.0.1.4 Experience

When examining the overall disclosure of the Board members’ experience according to the
classification of the RAC organisations, on average over the three years, the government
providers account for 25.7% (22 out of 87) of the Board members’ experience disclosed, the
privately owned or publicly listed providers account for 53.3% (3 out of 5) of the Board
members’ experience disclosed, and the community and religious providers account for
32.1% (34 out of 105) of the Board members’ experience disclosed. Of those that disclosed
the community/religious RAC Providers had a higher disclosure level than the privately
owned/publicly listed or Government providers.
4.0.1.5 Other Directorships

When examining the overall disclosure of the Board members’ other directorships on other
boards according to the classification of the RAC organisations, on average over the three
years, the government providers account for 2.7% (2 out of 87) of the Board members’ other
directorships disclosed, the privately owned or publicly listed providers account for 26.7% (1
out of 5) of the Board members’ other directorships disclosed, and the community and
religious providers account for 3.2% (3 out of 105) of the Board members’ other
directorships disclosed. Of those that disclosed there was no notable difference between the
RAC Providers’ organisational classifications.
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4.0.1.6 Board Characteristics
The proportion of women that hold a position on the board of S&P/ASX200 Group (top 200
companies) is 18% in 2013 and 15% in 2012 (KPMG, 2014, p.27). The percentage of women
board members in this sample on average is 33%. This therefore indicates that this sector
(RAC) as a whole are performing better in terms of gender equality in board representation
(could be representative of this sector). This could also be representative of the number of
female appointed not-for-profit board members, whom gain initial experience on a not-forprofit board before progressing to a for-profit or publicly listed company board (paid board
positions as opposed to voluntary not-for-profit position).
4.0.2 Correlation Analysis
The Governance disclosure results reported in Table 4 indicates a significant positive
relationship between the RAC provider’s organisational classification and their disclosure of
their Governance statement (0.332) and director’s report (0.270). This indicates that these
variables are significantly correlated in this sample; meaning as the level of governance
disclosure increases, the RAC’s disclosure of their governance statement and director’s report
also increase. These results also reveal a significant positive correlation between the RAC
provider’s governance statement and the disclosure of their director’s report (0.222).
Therefore, as the level of disclosure of their governance statement increases, so does the level
of disclosure of their director’s report. However, this has the opposite effect on the disclosure
of their other directorships of their board members (-0.163).
In addition, these findings reveal a significant negative association between the disclosure of
their director’s report and their other directorships of their board members (-0.214). These
results also indicate a significant negative correlation between the director’s qualifications
and their experience (-0.224). Therefore, as the level of disclosure of their director’s
qualifications decreases, so does the level of disclosure of their experience. However, this has
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the opposite effect on the disclosure of their other directorships of their board members
(0.221). These results further indicate a significant negative relationship between the
director’s experience and their other directorships of their board members (-0.398).
Table 4: Pearson’s Correlation of Social Disclosure and RAC Classification
Governance

Organisational Governance Director’s Director’s
Director’s Other
Classification Statement
Report
Qualifications Experience Directorships

Organisational
Classification
Governance
Statement

0.332**

Director’s
Report (or
equivalent)

0.270**

0.222**

0.000

0.002

Director’s
Qualifications

-0.014

-0.035

-0.063

0.840

0.621

0.376

Director’s
Experience

-0.096

0.030

0.079

-0.224**

0.178

0.678

0.267

0.002

Other
Directorships

0.106

-0.163*

-0.214**

0.221**

-0.398**

0.137

0.022

0.003

0.002

0.000

0.000

** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); * Correlation is significant at 0.05 level
(2-tailed)

5.0 Summary and Conclusions
The results indicated a significant association between each of the governance variables and
their level of disclosure. Meaning that there was a strong positive relationship between the
RAC providers’ level of governance disclosure.
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Overall, the results indicated that the sample Australian RAC providers, disclosed their board
composition to varying degrees. However, there is no formal governance report. The RAC
providers tended to disclose their governance in either their annual report, separate finance
report and/or on their individual websites providing varying degrees of detail.
Conclusion the RAC Sector disclosure and reporting of governance could be enhanced by a
specific RAC Sector Governance Framework.
The RAC Sector Governance Framework (Figure 2) illustrates the key elements that combine
to form the Governance section grouped within the Social Disclosure part of the RAC
Sector’s annual reporting. The RAC Sector Governance Disclosure should incorporate their
Governance Statement, Director’s report (or equivalent), organisational characteristics and
Board characteristics.
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Figure 2: RAC Sector Governance Framework

Risk
Management

Subcommittees
Stakeholder
Management
Length of
Service
Disclosure
&
Transparency

Ethics

Qualifications

Experience

Other
Directorship
s

Following on from the RAC Sector Governance Framework (Figure 2), the RAC Sector
Governance Principles will be further detailed, these are specific RAC Sector principles
based on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX, 2014) recommendations and other
research. This model presented below will be known as the G-CARD (Governance Checklist
Aged Residential Disclosure), this will enable RAC Sector organisations to assess what
governance information they are currently disclosing, but more importantly what governance
information they need to disclose to stakeholders to help them make more informed
decisions.
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The G-CARD (Governance Checklist Aged Residential Disclosure)
The RAC Governance Framework is outlined in Table 5. This framework has been adapted to
reflect the relevant recommended principles that the RAC sector should aim to adhere.
Table 5: G-CARD (Governance Checklist Aged Residential Disclosure)

1

Governance
Principles
Board Culture

2

Board
Members

3

Disclosure
and
Transparency

4

Stakeholders

5

Ethics and
Risk
Management

Recommendations

Yes


No
X

Size – The number of members on the Board should abide by the entity’s
bylaws.
Composition – The composition of the Board, where applicable and
appropriate, should be diverse with respect to disability, gender, culture,
experience and skills, in line with the entity’s strategic objectives and
goals.
Roles and Responsibility – The roles, expectations and legal
responsibilities of the Board should be clearly defined, understood and
respected. The Board roles and responsibilities should be set out in the
entity’s constitution.
Performance Evaluation – The performance of the Board and overall
quality of governance should be reviewed, assessed and monitored, to
ensure all activities are aligned with the entity’s vision, mission,
purpose, strategies and objectives.
Experience – Ensure Board member are transparent in relation to their
past and present experience.
Qualifications – Ensure all Board members disclose their qualifications
and skills.
Other Board Memberships – Ensure all Board members disclose any
previous board memberships, positions and/or experience.
Length of Service – The commencement and end date of all Board
members should disclosed to their stakeholders in a timely and accurate
manner.
Sub-committees (remuneration, audit, nomination, risk) – Transparent
disclosure of all Board sub-committees, outlining the members of the
committees and attendance.
This information should pertain to:
Non-financial Information – Disclosure of the entity’s vision statement,
mission statement, objectives and strategies;
Financial Information – Disclosure of the entity’s Comprehensive
Statement of Comprehensive Income, Statement of Financial Position,
Cash Flow Statement, Statement of Changes in Equity/funds (where
applicable), Notes to Financial Statements, Audit information, and any
other pertinent information (such as ratio analysis); and
Social Information – Disclosure of the entity’s governance (Governance
Statement and/or director’s report, Board composition and Board
characteristics) and Sustainability activities (Sustainability report).
Consultancy – The entity should actively consult and encourage
stakeholder engagement, to ensure effective, transparent, equitable and
accurate communication and participation.
Code of Conduct – Ensure the entity has a formal code of conduct,
values and behaviours.
Reputation – Ensure the entity operates in an ethical and sustainable
manner, with respect to the community in which the entity operates
within.
Risk Management - Ensure risk management systems are in place to
mitigate and manage risks

Source: Adapted from ASX Corporate Governance Council, (2014); McNamara (n.d.); Not For Profit
Compliance Support Centre (2013, November 21).
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This research answers the following research question: RQ: What is the level of disclosure
and reporting of governance practices by Australian Residential Aged Care providers to
stakeholders? This leads to the following conclusion: Conclusion the RAC Sector disclosure
and reporting of governance could be enhanced by using a specific RAC Sector Governance
Framework and use of the G-CARD Model to identify governance needs.
There can be little doubt that would be residents, their relatives and those acting on their
behalf, would like to be able to choose which aged care facility best meets the financial and
care positions of their relatives and loved ones. There is equally no doubt that those who run
such aged care facilities are in the best position to provide such information. But, the analysis
which has preceded above indicates that they generally have failed to do so. The Governance
Framework and Principles were developed to address this lack of adequate and consistent
disclosure in the Australian RAC Sector.
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